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Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporations
Richard C. Klein*
O r AUGUST 3, 1962 a memorandum decision was handed
down in an antitrust proceeding which startled practicing
attorneys and text writers alike. It held specifically that the
"attorney-client privilege" did not apply to the corporate client.'
What had been accepted as law for over one hundred and
twenty-five years was curtly cast aside by Chief Judge William
J. Campbell.
The decision was an even greater surprise to the parties
involved in the action. There was, in fact, no brief submitted
by either party on the precise issue, because the presiding judge
had been reluctantly applying the privilege for about a year dur-
ing the course of the action and the parties were not alerted that
this issue was going to be considered.
The action was brought by the plaintiff in connection with
defendants' violations of antitrust legislation to the damage of
the plaintiff. During the pretrial and discovery proceedings, the
judge read and considered several files of assorted documents
submitted by counsel for the defendant. Counsel contended that
the information contained in these files was obtained by them in
their capacity as attorneys for American Gas Association, a de-
fendant, and that therefore, the documents were privileged
from disclosure to the plaintiff. Some of the documents were
returned to the defendant's counsel during the course of an
earlier pretrial hearing and other documents were designated
as not being of the nature to justify the allowance of the
attorney-client privilege. These latter documents were delivered
over to plaintiff's attorney for inspection. From that earlier
hearing there remained eight letters, and one document from the
Delco Appliance Division of General Motors, one of the other
defendants, with which the judge was concerned in this ruling to
which defense counsel contended that the attorney-client privi-
lege applied.
* B.S. in Accounting, Bowling Green University; Senior at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, et al., 207 F. Supp.
771 (N. D. Ill., Aug. 3, 1962).
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In his ruling, Campbell, Chief Judge, stated:
I myself and from their briefs all counsel herein, have taken
for granted or presumed that a corporation is entitled to the
privilege. Indeed, as previously noted herein, I have granted
it in this case. My subsequent research into the problem,
however, has failed to indicate any authority for so doing
or wherein the courts decided that the privilege should be
extended to corporations.
While most of the cases alluding to this point have not ex-
plained in express terms why they have treated the attorney-
client privilege as applicable to corporations, the trial court here
underestimated the weight of the decisions which have applied
the privilege to such cases. For one hundred and twenty-five
years the judiciary have applied the privilege to corporations
without dispute.2 In 1950 a court in New York stated: 3
2 The following cases have assumed or held the privilege to exist:
FEDERAL cases:
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 236 U. S. 318, 336 (1919);
Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F. 2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1950);
Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F. 2d 924, 930-31 (10th Cir., 1954);
A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S. D. N. Y. 1950);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. R. C. A., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 241 (N. D.
N. Y. 1960); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 18 F. R. D. 463 (S. D. N. Y. 1956); RCA v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.
R. D., 440 (N. D. Ill. 1955); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman
Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1898); Leonia Amusement Corp.
v. Loew's Inc. 13 F. R. D. 438 (S. D. N. Y. 1952); International Minerals
and Chemicals Corp. v. Golding-Keene Co., 162 F. Supp. 137 (W. D.
N. Y. 1958); Commerciao E. Industria Continental, S. A. v. Dresser
Industries, Inc., 19 F. R. D. 513 (S. D. N. Y. 1956); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 1958 CCH-Trade Cases
ss 68,954 (W. D. Penn. 1958); United States v. Insurance Board of
Cleveland, 1954 CCH-Trade Cases ss 67,873 (N. D. Ohio 1954); Wonne-
man v. Stratford Securities Co., Inc., 23 F. R. D. 281 (S. D. N. Y. 1959).
STATE cases:
Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W. 2d 413, 139 A.L.R. 1242 (1942);
Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo, 32 N. J. Super. 15, 107 A. 2d 527 (1954);
Robertson v. Virginia, 181 Va. 520, 25 S. E. 2d 352, 146 A. L. R. 966
(1943); Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P. 2d 1025 (1954);
Jessup v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P. 2d 177 (1959);
Fire Ass'n v. Fleming, 3 S. E. 420 (Sup. Ct. of Ga. 1887); Russell v.
Second Nat. Bank, 136 N. J. L. 270, 55 A. 2d 211 (1911); Ex parte
Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N. E. 276, 6 L. R. A. N. S. 325 (1906); In Re
Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 413, 79 N. E. 2d 224, 227 (1948); Davenport Co.
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895); Beach v. Oil
Transfer Corp., 143 (48) N. Y. L. J. Col. 4M (Spec. Term Kings Co.
3-11-60); Pressman v. C. B. S., Inc., 133 (51) N. Y. L. J. 7 Col. 4M
(Spec. Term N. Y. Co. 3-15-55); Stahl v. Federated Meat Corp., 121
(114) N. Y. L. J. 2102 Col. 3F (Spec. Term Queens Co. 6-13-49);
(Continued on next page)
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Since these early statements the necessity of protecting the
attorney-client relationship has become even more apparent;
the legal rights and duties of large corporations and those
who dispute with them would not be susceptible of judicial
administration in the absence of lawyers, nor, in the absence
of the privilege could lawyers properly represent their
clients. I am, frankly, hesitant to do anything which would
contribute to the undermining of the protection afforded by
the time-honored rule which excludes from evidence such
confidential communications.
That same year in Massachusetts in a civil antitrust action
brought by the United States, it was held that some of the
exhibits to which defendant objected were within the attorney-
client privilege, while others were not.
4
The United States Supreme Court has spoken in favor of the
privilege, although the issue was not decided specifically.5 And
in the course of holding that correspondence per se was not
intended to be included within the scope and extent of a Con-
gressional investigation statute which the government was trying
to enforce against the company, it followed then, that the
attorney-client privilege applied to correspondence between the
attorney and his client, and in addition that such correspondence
was not subject to investigation. Judge Campbell noted in his
opinion that the attorney-client privilege was mentioned in only
one small paragraph, and while acknowledging the "privilege,"
noted that the government had not even made an issue of it.
(Continued from preceding page)
Reiser Co. v. Loew's Inc., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 861 (Spec. Term, N. Y. Co.
1948); L. Michel Plumb. & Heat. Corp. v. Randall Ave. Theatre Corp.,
39 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Spec. Term N. Y. Co. 1943).
ENGLISH cases:
Beginning with Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 My & K. 88, 39
Eng. Rep. 614 (1833) there have been no less than 9 reported cases
prior to 1900.
3 A. B. Dick v. Marr. supra n. 2, affd. on other grounds, 197 F. 2d 498
(2nd Cir.), cert. den. 344 U. S. 878.
4 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (U. S. D. C. Mass.)
decided 3/10/50, supra n. 2,
In a civil antitrust action by the United States, the court specifically
noted that:
It follows that insofar as these letters were prepared to solicit or give
an opinion on law or legal services, such parts of them are privileged
as contain, or have opinion based on information furnished by an officer
or employee of the defendant in confidence and without the presence
of third persons.
5 United States v. Louisville and Nashville R. R., supra, n. 2.
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Many other cases have accepted the existence of the
attorney-client privilege as applying to corporations without ever
putting it in issue.6 The Ohio Supreme Court made reference to
the privilege by the following: 7
We can see no reason to limit or modify the rule because
the defendant is a corporation and obtained its information
and made its memoranda for the purposes stated through
the usual agencies of the corporation.
In Civil Aeronautics Board v. Air Transport Association
(D. D. C., Civ. Act. No. 3214-60) the court declared in its oral
opinion of Oct 3, 1961:
The Court is of the opinion that the attorney-client privilege
may be asserted in the proceeding pending before the Civil
Aeronautics Board and involved in this action.
The text writers have treated the privilege as applying to
corporations, and with apparent unanimity have at least defined
the term "client," as embodying corporations as well as natural
persons." The Model Code of Evidence in Rule 209, and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence in Rule 26(3) likewise include
"corporation" in their definitions of client. Furthermore, the
Canons of Ethics now declare that it is the duty of a lawyer to
preserve his client's confidences without distinction between
individual or corporate clients.9
From the authorities cited, it appears that there are certain
legal concepts which are accepted as logical conclusions without
any court specifically deciding that such concepts must be ac-
cepted. This is the nature of the attorney-client privilege as it
applies to the corporate client.
It is important to consider that the decision in the immediate
case, should, if sustained on appeal, be limited to cases similar
in fact to the case at hand, and should not be, at the maximum,
extended beyond the withholding of the exercise of the privilege
in Federal pretrial discovery, and should be distinguished from
other matters such as trade secrets and work product of the
lawyer. By rejecting the attorney-client privilege to the corpo-
6 Cases noted supra in n. 2.
7 Ex Parte Schoepf, supra n. 2.
8 McCormick on Evidence 183 (1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2292
(McNaughton Rev., 1961).
9 American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 37.
(1957).
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rate client the free exercise of the judgment of the corporate
attorney will be hindered by the fear that if he expresses his
opinion he may at some future time be directly responsible for
his client's subsequent loss of a law suit.
If Judge Campbell is sustained on appeal, the work product
rule granting the attorney's privilege against having his work
and efforts disclosed will have to be relied on more heavily.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
